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Abstract
To mitigate the risk of social unrest, the North Korean government 
has attempted to integrate information technology into its 
system of social controls. Cell phones and other communications 
technology are a material incentive for the North Korean elite, 
as well as a means of controlling information for the population. 
Penalties for possession of forbidden technology or the misuse 
of approved technology are harsh. Although the North Korean 
government seems confident that this social control system will 
allow the DPRK to take advantage of the positive elements of 
these technologies while minimizing the social impact on the 
population, the North Koreans privileged enough to access this 
technology can communicate in ways that are unprecedented in 
the history of the state. 
Rather than expecting cell phones, the intranet and the Internet 
to induce a radical change in the North Korean state, policy-
makers should adopt a more cautious approach. Overt support 
for information technology as a tool for circumventing state 
controls will result in further restrictions. Financially supporting 
technology in North Korea is very possible, but limited in impact 
due to the control mechanisms of the state, international 
sanctions, and the risks associated with investing in North 
Korea. A modest strategy would be to feed information into the 
DPRK that will support development that necessitates links to 
institutions abroad and integration with the region.
Key words: North Korea, social unrest, Koryolink, information 
technology, Internet
Introduction
Following the Arab Spring, there is hope that access to 
information technology (IT) and social media will have a 
liberalizing effect on authoritarian states. Optimists believe that 
increased access to information will undermine authoritarian 
governments and bolster democratic social movements. Other 
case studies conclude that information technology can only 
weaken authoritarian states.1 Pessimists, on the other hand, 
have emphasized the potential of the information technology 
to support authoritarian regimes through information control, 
surveillance, and propaganda.2
For the purposes of this analysis, we will assume that technology 
does not have an intrinsic liberalizing effect. We will consider 
technology to be a tool with constructive and disruptive effects; 
it is a tool with the potential to strengthen or undermine both 
institutional and distributed actors. These impacts can be 
positive or negative depending on the location and interests 
of the parties involved. Applications of information technology 
that undermine institutional interests can coordinate popular 
protests against authoritarian regimes, or it can support criminal 
activity or undermine the rule of law in democratic states. In 
short, the same technology that Tunisians used to organize 
popular protests against President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali can 
be used by prison gangs in Brazil to coordinate attacks on police.3 
North Korea is a place where optimistic dreams of technology-
driven liberalism go to die. The Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea (DPRK) limits the flow of information into, out of, and 
within the country to maintain control over the population. 
Radios are hardwired to only receive government-run channels, 
and foreign media is strictly forbidden. Despite these restrictions, 
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North Korea has begun to encourage the use of information 
technology to increase efficiency and remove an impediment to 
foreign direct investment.4 DPRK defectors who worked in the 
country’s IT sector have called this the “mosquito net” strategy.5 
The regime plans to reap the positive benefits of the technology 
while limiting the ideological pollution associated with use of cell 
phones, the intranet, and Internet.
To mitigate the risk of social unrest, the regime has attempted 
to integrate information technology into its system of social 
controls. Cell phones and other communications technology 
are a material incentive for the North Korean elite, as well as a 
means of controlling information for the population. Penalties 
for possession of forbidden technology or the misuse of 
approved technology are harsh. Although the North Korean 
government seems confident that this system of bribes, blinders, 
and bludgeons will allow the DPRK to take advantage of the 
positive elements of these technologies while minimizing the 
social impact on the population, the North Koreans privileged 
enough to access this technology can communicate in ways that 
are unprecedented in the history of the state. 
Bribes: Information Technology as a Material Incentive 
for North Korean Elite
Cell phones, the intranet, and the Internet are a luxury reserved 
for the DPRK elite. Just as North Korea isolated the impact of 
the floods and famine of the 1990s on the most marginalized 
members of its population, the state prices and controls 
information technology such that only the most wealthy and 
privileged, and thus—the regime hopes—the most loyal, will 
have access to it. 
Cell phones are the most common information technology tool 
in North Korea, but remain limited to the North Korean urban 
elite. The government-approved Koryolink system offers cell 
phones that can call within the state, but not outside of it. At this 
time, approximately two million cell phones are in circulation in 
North Korea, although Yonho Kim notes that many are used as 
communications tools by government personnel.6 Cell phones 
are expensive, meaning that only the relatively wealthy can 
access the technology. Average monthly charges for the phones 
are around $13.90 a month, expensive for a country with average 
GDP of $2,000 per person.7 In addition, the subscriber network is 
limited to those with the time and money to take time off work, 
travel to the Communication Technology Management (CTM) 
office, and pay any bribes and fees necessary to ensure that their 
paperwork is processed.8
The Koryolink network is largely urban; it covers Pyongyang and 
all of the cities in the North.9 Since cell phones require a power 
source to work, their use is limited to areas with a reliable energy 
supply. In rural areas, the North Korean electricity grid is decrepit, 
and, even if there is cell phone coverage, owning and using a 
phone is not practical. In these remote areas where electricity 
is stored in car batteries and used to heat water, keeping cell 
phones charged is not a priority.10
Some privileged North Koreans also have access to Kwangmyong, 
the North Korean intranet. The intranet is a closed network; the 
North Korean government monitors the discussion boards and 
chat services it offers, and screens and approves any media on 
the network.11 An even rarer subset of the population will have 
controlled and monitored access to the Internet. The exceptions 
to these controls are the super-elite of the state, who have 
unfettered access to the web. This population may only number 
a dozen or more families within the North.12 Their access to 
information on the world outside North Korea is not a threat 
to the state’s information blockade as they occupy the highest 
echelons of the DPRK power structure. 
Some university students also have controlled and policed 
access to the Internet. They must apply for access, justifying 
their need to use the Internet for research on approved topics. 
The computer facilities are locked, and search histories are 
monitored.13 Pyongyang University of Science and Technology 
(PUST), a privately funded university in the DPRK, is the exception 
to this rule. Students at PUST have almost unfettered access to 
the Internet.14 There is a limited connection—only one IP address 
is available—but students do not have to apply for permission 
to access the Internet.15 PUST represents an important test case 
in the use of the Internet in North Korea. It is not clear if the 
graduates, having been contaminated by foreign influences, 
will be allowed to move into important positions in the DPRK 
after graduation or if they will be buried in ministries or sent to 
overseas posts.
The DPRK government also allows key North Koreans to use 
the Internet for research or communication with the outside 
world for state-sanctioned business. This business includes the 
array of DPRK propaganda websites, including KCNA, as well as 
tourism websites, and other ventures aimed at bringing in hard 
currency from outside North Korea. Similarly, members of the 
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Korean People’s Army, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other 
groups whose job entails gathering information on the U.S., ROK, 
and others can access the Internet for research purposes. These 
groups are trusted to access the Internet based on their role 
promoting the state’s interests.
Finally, North Koreans abroad representing DPRK missions and 
consulates, working in international organizations, or running 
profit centers have access to the Internet based on local 
restrictions. The missions and profit centers have an ideological 
minder, an officer responsible for ensuring that the staff behave 
appropriately.16 Even when a minder is not present, North 
Koreans abroad tend to police each other; North Koreans using 
their computers for unorthodox purposes or caught visiting a 
local Internet café risk being reported to the state. 
Cell phones and the intranet function as toys for the North 
Korean elite and tools for the DPRK government. In this sense, 
cell phones are another luxury item that the regime utilizes for 
its own benefit and allows the wealthy to access as a material 
incentive. Those who access this technology flaunt it; USB flash 
drives are worn as a conspicuous symbol of access to technology.17
Blinders: Information Control and Propaganda
Aside from providing toys for the North Korean elite, the state’s 
control of information technology affords it an opportunity to 
disseminate propaganda. In Ruediger Frank’s unboxing of the 
North Korean tablet computer, he notes that it comes pre-loaded 
with the collected wit and wisdom of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-
il, as well as books by Charles Dickens and Victor Hugo intended 
to show the bleakness of life in a capitalist society.18 Koryolink 
phones reportedly receive daily propaganda text messages from 
the state.19
Internet control mechanisms involve limited access to facilities, 
and surveillance of individual use. The DPRK government 
monitors most Internet accounts used for business. Inbound 
communications are checked by a central authority, and can 
be accessed by the e-mail recipient only if deemed acceptable, 
usually from a controlled area using a monitored terminal.20 If 
the sender is not cleared to communicate with the North, the 
e-mail will not be passed on to the intended receiver, and a 
“message not delivered” message will be e-mailed back to the 
sender. While these messages are automated responses in other 
countries, they are hand-typed in North Korea.
In addition to disseminating state propaganda, these techno-
logies keep information from leaking into or out of the country. 
Koryolink cell phones alleviate demand for Chinese mobiles, 
which function near the border using Chinese cell towers and 
can call outside of the country. Similarly, while it cannot hold a 
candle to South Korean soap operas, the controlled media on 
the North Korean intranet can substitute for foreign media that 
is leaking into the country. The regime is thus able to substitute a 
constructive technology for a potentially disruptive one. 
Furthermore, the value in having a state-run network is that the 
government can shut down cell phones and pull the plug on the 
intranet if it becomes a threat to the regime. While governments 
in Tunisia and elsewhere found themselves at the mercy of 
social networks run by foreign companies such as Twitter 
and Facebook, North Korea is not beholden to an externally 
controlled network.21
Bludgeons: Punishments and Social Controls
The advent of the Koryolink system has seen a corresponding 
crackdown on the use of unauthorized technologies.22 The North 
Korean government uses detection equipment to track users of 
Chinese cell phones.23 Those who use these forbidden mobile 
devices for business or other purposes have learned to use 
them away from home and in controlled, short bursts to avoid 
detection.24 Other coercive measures include strengthened 
penalties for possession of foreign media. Inspections and 
penalties for information crimes have been increased as a 
disincentive for use of verboten media.25 Legal restrictions for 
access to this technology have likewise been strengthened.26
While information technology has the potential to empower 
distributed, non-governmental actors, the institutionalized and 
persuasive system of social controls in North Korea incentivizes 
risk-averse behavior. The songbun hereditary class system in 
the North continues to determine access to resources and 
opportunity in North Korea. This system controls access to 
everything from food to healthcare to education to employment 
in the DPRK.27 This ensures that those with money in the North 
are those who have been deemed loyal to the state. While this 
system is by no means perfect, it means that those with the money 
and opportunity necessary to access information technology are 
those with a large stake in the survival of the state for political, 
economic, or other reasons. Similarly, the songbun system means 
that any disloyalty puts three generations of the family at risk.28
Information Technology and Social Controls in North Korea
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Likewise, the inminban system that encourages neighbors to 
police other neighbors reinforces social controls and discourages 
the use of technology for destabilizing purposes. While the 
inminban system has weakened, it still discourages the sort 
of social mobilization that communication technology would 
otherwise empower.29 Given that almost all access to the 
Internet in North Korea is from a government-controlled facility, 
North Koreans are aware that their activity is monitored and 
moderate their behavior appropriately. If even watching a 
South Korean drama is a dangerous undertaking, then publicly 
communicating discontent is unlikely.30 The pervasive fear of 
being reported by neighbors retards the development of non-
government networks.31
Even while surveillance networks have deteriorated over the 
last two decades, monitoring the intranet and Internet is still 
relatively easy. In China, companies with web infrastructure that 
includes discussion boards are recommended to employ one 
monitor/censor for every 50,000 users.32 Since there are a limited 
number of intranet users in North Korea, a relatively small force 
of censors would be sufficient to police the entire system. Many 
surveillance features, such as recognizing search terms, can be 
automated to control Internet use.
Furthermore, the availability of mechanisms to undermine the 
state does not mean that there is interest in using them. Many 
North Koreans, particularly elites who see their future bound 
with the state as it exists today, view the government control 
mechanisms as a positive force for security and stability in the 
DPRK.33 North Koreans have been raised under a siege mentality 
that there is a pervasive and unyielding threat from the outside 
world. Government efforts to keep those forces at bay are viewed 
by many North Koreans as a good thing. 
Even if North Koreans hate the system, they have little to gain 
by undermining it. Undermining the DPRK’s rule would mean 
being swallowed up by Chinese and South Korean interests. A 
more realistic goal would be to develop a gray-market business 
enterprise that would allow them to benefit within the North 
Korean system, potentially using information technology to 
circumvent some of the institutional gatekeepers for these 
business. As Andrei Lankov notes, “the long term interests of 
the North Korean business class might even coincide with that of 
the Kim regime and its officials—even though now they see each 
other as a swarm of parasites.”34
The use of communications technology in North Korea thus 
follows the totalitarian playbook of bribes for the elite, blinders 
for the masses, protecting them from ideologically impure 
content, and coercive measures to suppress threating media and 
reinforce social controls. This system allows the North Korean 
government to focus on the constructive elements of this 
technology while minimizing the disruptive implications. 
Opportunities
North Korea has attempted to integrate information technology 
into its system of social controls. Rather than empower 
distributed actors to undermine the rule of the state, North Korea 
has ensured that access to information technology is reserved 
for the elite; the technology limits information into or out of the 
country; and significant coercive measures exist to disincentivize 
improper use of the technology. 
Bruce Schneier notes three key characteristics that allow 
dispersed networks to use information technology tools against 
institutional actors: transparency, oversight (including free press, 
civil society and other watchdogs), and open access to data.35 
These factors allow information technology to act as a check on 
institutional power. At this time, North Korea stringently polices 
access to data and lacks even a nascent non-governmental sector 
to provide oversight over the state. 
As T.S. Eliot wrote, “it is impossible to design a system so perfect 
that no one needs to be good.” Although the DPRK government 
allows access to information technology based on perceived 
loyalty to the state and has built-in controls to limit the potential 
misuse of this technology, North Koreans can now communicate 
in unprecedented ways, which in turn has altered the way the 
DPRK government controls information. 
The most important shift is that the North Korean government 
will have to triage surveillance activities. With two million cell 
phones in operation in the North, the number of conversations 
in the state has exceeded the ability of the state’s security 
“Rather than empower distributed 
actors to undermine the rule of the state, 
North Korea has ensured that access to 
information technology is reserved for the 
elite; the technology limits information 
into or out of the country; and significant 
coercive measures exist to disincentivize 
improper use of the technology.”
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mechanism to track all of the conversations. North Koreans use 
their mobile phones approximately as much as their South Korean 
counterparts.36 Landlines in the DPRK could be easily monitored; 
they were limited in number, tightly controlled by different 
bureaucracies in the state, and used much less frequently than 
cell phones.37 The sheer number of conversations exceeds the 
ability of the government to police them, and the state security 
department is likely to focus surveillance on certain parties, 
probably foreign nationals and ideologically suspect individuals.38
While the number of mouths speaking has overwhelmed the 
number of ears listening, the information that the speakers can 
share has also expanded. The ubiquitous USB drives, conspicuous 
symbols of access to information technology, also allow North 
Koreans to share anything from economic data to South Korean 
soap operas.39 Likewise, memory chips in cell phones can be 
traded and shared, allowing media to be watched on phones at 
home, in the street, or anywhere else.40 DVDs, the traditional 
means of sharing media, were much easier to track. Officials 
could shut down power to a unit and check the DVD in the player. 
USB drives, SD cards, and memory chips are far easier to hide 
and share. 
When using government-approved technologies, North Koreans 
are becoming information seekers. The very act of looking 
outside the country for information is unprecedented in the 
North.41 For example, the intranet includes state-approved 
research on science and technology topics.42 This is consistent 
with Kim Jong-un’s proclamation that the Internet should be 
used to harness scientific information from the outside world 
for development purposes.43
With these changes, the North Korean government has shifted 
from a goal of total information control to one of voluntary 
compliance with high penalties for transgression. Under the 
new system, networks can develop and share information, 
even if just between privileged classes. This creates a new 
space for non-government actors that did not previously exist. 
Unmonitored networks can develop and share a range of 
data and media easier than ever before. While penalties and 
social controls disincentivize these activities, space exists in an 
unprecedented manner. 
While the advent of information technology in North Korea is 
not likely to lead to a radical transformation that empowers 
distributed actors, it is likely to exacerbate the influence of 
foreign media. Over the next decade, the combination of mar-
kets, generational change, and information technology has the 
potential to fundamentally alter the state and creates a strong 
incentive to integrate North Korea into the dynamic economies 
of Northeast Asia. While the technology is not likely to be a 
driver of social instability or unrest in the country, cell phones, 
the intranet, and the Internet facilitate the spread of foreign 
media, and enable networks within the state that can be used 
for other purposes. 
Policy Implications
One opportunity presented by the advent of communications 
technology in North Korea is the possibility to circumvent the 
control of the state. The goals for these efforts would include 
subverting control of the government and getting more 
information into and out of North Korea. Given that the North 
Korean state controls content and monitors discussion forums on 
the intranet, as well as the limited number of North Koreans with 
access to the Internet, the best tool for this activity would be 
mobile phones. Although this application of mobile technology 
is certainly possible, circumvention efforts have a high risk of 
provoking a crackdown on mobile phone users by the North 
Korean government. 
For NGOs and governments, the strong and laudable desire to 
encourage change in North Korea by widening the exposure 
to the outside world is likely to result in a crackdown on the 
North Koreans who are targeted by it and an ensuing shutdown 
of humanitarian channels with North Korea. In response to an 
information campaign involving leaflets organized by South 
Korean NGOs, North Korea executed several people possessing 
the leaflets and shut down diplomatic relations with South 
Korea.44 Cell phones were banned for four years after the 
regime attributed an explosion at a railway station in the city of 
Ryongchon to a cell phone activated bomb.45 It is hard to imagine 
North Korea shutting down the network at this stage, but the 
DPRK could increase prices to limit the number of customers, 
scale back future plans to expand the network, or take other 
measures to tighten controls over cell phones and IT. While the 
sensitivity that North Korea displays toward these information 
campaigns indicates a weak point for the regime, overt circum-
vention campaigns are just as likely to burn bridges, at both the 
state and non-state levels, to North Korea as build them.
Alternatively, since the development of information technology 
in North Korea has the potential to encourage the long-term 
transformation of the state, a strategy for governments and non-
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governmental organizations could be to engage with that sector 
to encourage its development. These engagement opportunities 
are available to a variety of different actors, ranging from for profit 
business ventures to NGO capacity building training projects. The 
challenge to these engagement projects is that the collaboration 
is controlled by the North Korean state. Outsourcing operations 
will generally involve working with a North Korean partner 
who will act as an intermediary for all production in-country. 
The outsourcing company will have no regular presence on the 
ground to oversee the operations. This can be frustrating for the 
company and limits the transformative impact of these programs 
in the DPRK.
Attempting to circumvent the DPRK information technology 
system is just as likely to shut down communication channels 
as build them, and investment in the North Korean IT sector is 
risky due to sanctions, weak governance, and other risks. The 
most effective strategy to respond to these changes in North 
Korea may be to find ways to feed technical data that outlines 
best practices for economic development into the DPRK intranet. 
Topics for this data could range from public health, best practices 
in agriculture, energy efficiency and development, economic 
literacy, banking, etc. As mentioned before, importing this data 
into the North has been blessed at the highest level of the state 
by Kim Jong-un himself. This data would support economic 
development in North Korea, build collaboration between 
North Korea and the outside world, and increase the reliance on 
information technology in the state.
The advent of information technology in North Korea is a signifi-
cant event. A fundamental part of the state’s security strategy 
rested in the keeping its population isolated and uninformed. 
That said, the DPRK government is cognizant of the disruptive 
potential of information technology, and have attempted to 
integrate access to cell phones, the intranet, and the Internet 
into its system of social controls. 
Information technology is not a Trojan horse that the North 
Koreans have mistakenly let through their gates. Rather than 
expecting cell phones, the intranet and the Internet to induce a 
radical change in the North Korean state, policy makers should 
adopt a more cautious approach. Overt support for information 
technology as a tool for circumventing state controls will 
result in further restrictions. Investing in technology in North 
Korea is very possible, but limited in impact due to the control 
mechanisms of the state, international sanctions, and the risks 
associated with investing in North Korea. A modest strategy 
would be to feed information into the DPRK that will support 
development that necessitates links to institutions abroad and 
integration with the region.
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